Television interview, TVNZ Q+A

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The Hon Richard Marles MP

Deputy Prime Minister

Minister for Defence

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dpm.media@defence.gov.au

02 6277 7800

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6 October 2024

SUBJECTS: South Pacific Defence Ministers’ Meeting; Pacific Response Group; Climate change in the Pacific; Net Zero by 2050; AUKUS; Australia-China relationship; Australia-New Zealand relationship; US Presidential election.

JACK TAME, HOST: We begin this morning with the state of security and defence in the Pacific. This week, defence ministers from seven Pacific nations gathered in Auckland and agreed to establish a Pacific Response Group, a multilateral force to respond to crises across the region. Among the visiting ministers was Australia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles. I asked him how that force will work. 

RICHARD MARLES, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER: Well, a Pacific Response Group is really a means by which we can make sure that the well-intentioned reflexes which exist in the Pacific to help each other in moments of need – we're thinking natural disasters, that kind of thing, but potentially other security issues which have arisen in the Pacific – that we have a rehearsed, organised group which enacts those reflexes really quickly. And so that that's what the Pacific Response Group will do. It will be combined of all the members of SPDMM. It's obviously not going to go into any country without the invitation of that country. But if you imagine a natural disaster such as what we saw in Tonga with the volcanic eruption, or a cyclone, this will be a means by which there is a rapid, rehearsed response from a Pacific team to provide that defence assistance to those countries which are so needed in that moment. 

TAME: Other security issues, you said?

MARLES: Well, if you look at, in the past with RAMSI and Solomon Islands, where you did have very much a Pacific group in terms of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, one can imagine in the future that the Pacific Response Group might play a role such as that. Again, it would only be at the invitation of a country. But that was a really significant response from the Pacific, which was actually lauded around the world as a post‑conflict intervention with the permission of the host country, which did so much great work. This is a means by which I think we can, as SPDMM members, those countries in the Pacific which have defence forces, we can work together to regularise those responses and make sure those responses are as rapid as possible. In the first instance, the focus is very much on HADR events, natural disasters, where we’re going in and helping. 

TAME: Theoretically, if a future scenario warranted it, would this group be armed?

MARLES: Well, I mean, if you're talking about HADR, so, coming in after a natural disaster, the answer that question is no. 

TAME: But those other security issues?

MARLES: Well, RAMSI, when you look at that, people did have arms. Again, it was at the invitation of the country. And that's something that needs to be worked through, but we are talking about defence forces.

TAME: What do you see as being the greatest risk to regional security?

MARLES: Well, I think we live in a world which is much more complex, which is much more strategically contested. That creates pressure for the region. I think in that context, perhaps to flip the question, the great opportunity for us is to make sure that we are building Pacific‑led responses to issues. And I think that does deal with– really provides great resilience for the Pacific, but also therefore deals with the real threats. I mean, the other obvious point to make, and you speak to any Pacific island country about what is their greatest security threat, the answer will unanimously be climate change. And it's why we can think about geostrategic contests, state actors and the like, actually, it is natural disasters which is the issue that is felt most presently, which is felt most viscerally. And defence forces definitely have a role to play in those moments, which is why I think it's so important that we're thinking that through. 

TAME: I'll ask about state actors in a moment, but you mentioned climate change. So Australia is one of the world's largest exporters of coal. Ministers from your own party have recently approved coal mine expansions. Does that dent your credibility with Pacific nations?

MARLES: Well, firstly, we very much understand that having a credible pathway in Australia to achieving zero net emissions by 2050, well is actually very important for our own country, but is critically important in terms of having– 

TAME: That doesn't include exports, though, does it?

MARLES: No, but to be clear, you know, the exports that we have, if they were not in place, you would be seeing other exports replacing them from other countries. And of course, countries are responsible for their own emission reduction. So in the global system of the responsibilities that we have under the Paris Accord, exports don't form part of that, and exports ultimately are an important part of managing how we, as a globe, get to zero net emissions. But our focus and our responsibilities are on our own emissions, and we now have a very active and credible path to achieving zero net emissions by 2050 and I think that is something which has been acknowledged by the countries of the Pacific, and it's very important in terms of enabling us to credibly engage with the Pacific around this issue. 

I mean, the other point I'd make there is that the Pacific really is on the front line of climate change. I've seen that firsthand in all my travels around the Pacific. If you think about low‑lying atoll countries such as Kiribati or Tuvalu or Marshall Islands, the way in which climate change is experienced there is just on a different scale to how we experience it in Australia. And it's really important that we are doing everything within our power to help those countries tell their story to the world as countries which very much are on the frontline climate change. 

TAME: Wouldn't it be more valuable if Australia were to transition to a different export priority? So, the Minerals Council of Australia notes that you exported $127 billion Australian worth of coal in 2022‑2023. Wouldn't that make a difference to Kiribati’s future? 

MARLES: I'm not sure would in the sense that if we were not exporting, those exports would be replaced by other countries that were filling a market which was seeking coal, and those coal replacements would have greater emissions than what Australian coal is providing. Which is why I come back to the point, these things might sound, you know, simple in the headline, but when you actually scratch beneath the surface, you take Australian exports out of the equation, it may well end up with an increased emissions contribution in terms of the replacement product that those countries will be importing. So, it is why, you know, our exports are relevant here. Of course, we understand that each of those countries that are importing Australian coal will have their own plans to reduce their emissions and we understand that's part of what the global coal market will look like.

TAME: From an Australian perspective, why is the AUKUS agreement so important?

MARLES: Well, the AUKUS agreement is an agreement which provides for technology sharing between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, and most particularly and significantly, Australia acquiring a nuclear-powered submarine capability from those two countries. This is critically important for Australia. If you think about what we are as a nation, with ocean approaches to our continent, we are almost uniquely in need of a highly capable long‑range submarine. 

TAME: Why?

MARLES: Precisely because of our geography and because we have large ocean approaches to Australia. And because we are, if you think about our sea lines of communication, which are the physical connection of our trade, which is a huge part of our national prosperity, our national income, I mean those sea lines of communication go over massive distances, over ocean going distances. To protect them, to be able to give any adversary pause for thought, who might seek to disrupt them, who might seek to coerce our country, having a long-range capable submarine is fundamental to us. Now, that's not a new thought. We have a long-range capable submarine in the Collins class submarines, which are diesel electric submarines that we operate today and we've operated since around the year 2000. But the issue there is that when we look into the 2030s and the 2040s that kind of submarine capability is going to become increasingly detectable as diesel electric submarines are required to surface in order to charge their electric batteries, a process called snorting. A nuclear-powered submarine doesn't need to do that. So in fact, just to maintain the capability that we had, say, in the year 2005 going forward into the 2030s and beyond, we need to move down the path of nuclear propulsion. Now those submarines will have greater capability, of course, but this is the direction that we have to go and AUKUS is the means by which we have that. And were Australia to not have a long-range capable submarine capability, that is a significant diminution of Australia's military capability.

TAME: Have you seen those comments from Boris Johnson's new book? 

MARLES: I've not. 

TAME: So he said that he pushed to sign AUKUS, which meant Australia scrapping the previous deal to buy the French submarines as, quote, delicious revenge on the French. So why should any Australian want their country to be part of a deal whose architect pursued it for such unserious reasons?

MARLES: Well, I mean, Boris Johnson is going to say what he's going to say, I can only answer as I have– 

TAME: Delicious revenge?  

MARLES: Well, as I've just answered, our need to have these submarines is completely founded in our own strategic landscape and our own strategic need.

TAME: So, on that point, what guarantees can you give that Australia will be building, manning and operating the nuclear submarines?

MARLES: We give that guarantee. That's at the heart of the arrangement that we announced in March of last year and that now is underpinned by a treaty that we signed a couple of months ago with the United Kingdom and the United States. 

TAME: There has been some concern about the process so far and the production process going into the future. You don't share those concerns?

MARLES: We have challenges, for sure, in terms of– I mean, this is a huge thing that we're trying to do. This will be a massive national endeavour. And indeed, just from an industrial point of view, the building of these submarines in Australia will represent one of the biggest industrial undertakings in our history. So I'm not seeking to underestimate the challenge at hand, but I'm also confident that we will be able to achieve this. And in terms of the operation of the submarines themselves, these will be sovereign assets, they will be commanded by Australians, they'll have Australian crews on board. 

TAME: Will they have nuclear weapons on board? 

MARLES: No, they won't have nuclear weapons and we've been really clear about that. I mean, we're not intending to be a nuclear state. 

TAME: They’re nuclear-powered? 

MARLES: They’re nuclear-powered. So we're talking about a propulsion system which is which is obviously very contained. These will be conventionally-armed and we have no intention of walking down the path becoming a nuclear weapons state. Indeed, we’ve been very clear that in acquiring this capability, we meet all the obligations under the non‑proliferation treaty, we meet all the obligations under the Treaty of Rarotonga, which is a treaty which ensures that the Pacific is a place from which nuclear weapons do not operate.

TAME: What have you made of the debate over Pillar II of AUKUS in New Zealand? How do you think our attitudes towards regional security differ?

MARLES: Well, New Zealand has demonstrated some interest in participating in that part of AUKUS. So not the submarines, but the other technology transfer elements of AUKUS. And we've got consultations going with New Zealand at the moment. And it's not just New Zealand, Canada's displayed an interest here. And if you think about Canada and New Zealand as Five Eyes countries, that's pretty natural. Japan also has indicated an interest in participating in AUKUS Pillar II and certainly they're a country with incredible technology, and they bring a lot to the table. I mean, I think what we're seeing here in that sense is countries wanting to increase their own capability. That New Zealand would want to increase its own capability, we certainly welcome. A more capable New Zealand is very much in the interests of Australia and anything we can do to assist New Zealand in becoming more militarily capable is something that we see as of benefit.

TAME: I suppose the word we’ve danced around in this conversation so far is China. And from a New Zealand perspective, why would we join Pillar II if that risked antagonising our biggest trading partner?

MARLES: I don't think that's what it does. I mean, obviously these are matters for New Zealand, but from an Australian perspective, you know, we obviously have our largest trading partner being China as well. We have sought to do everything we can stabilize our relationship with China. We want the most productive relationship with China–

TAME: You also have an FTA with the US that New Zealand doesn't have. So, you have a more diversified export economy. 

MARLES: Well, we– 

TAME: You have a relationship with India that New Zealand doesn’t have.

MARLES: We have those things, but to be clear, we have a huge economic relationship with China. They are our largest trading partner. So China is deeply significant to Australia's recent economic history and certainly, we hope are a part of our economic future. I mean, we want to have, as I say, the most productive relationship that we can have with China. At the same time, we can't ignore the fact that China is a source of security anxiety and we will disagree with China where we must. Ultimately, what we seek to be is a country which seriously engages with China. Where we do bring to the table serious capability, which actually increases our diplomatic space, our diplomatic space in which we can engage politically, and in which we can engage with trade. So I don't think these things actually work opposite to each other. I think building capability, building seriousness, is actually what builds the space in which we can engage in this trade.

TAME: Is there anything more you want from New Zealand? 

MARLES: Well, there is no country in the world with whom we are as close as New Zealand. I mean, when we think about New Zealand, uniquely, in terms of our relationships in the community of nations, we think about New Zealand as family. And it's the one country where we feel that and I think that's something which is very reciprocal. We want to have the closest, the tightest relationship with New Zealand that we can have. We want that to be across the board in terms of politics, our economy, but very much in the space of defence as well and we are seeing that. You know, the level of interaction, interoperability between our two defence forces today is at the highest level it's ever been. We see a New Zealand Major General being embedded in our Joint Operation Command in the course of this week. That's the highest ranking embed that we've had in the Australian Defence Force ever from another country. And it makes complete sense that that country would be New Zealand. So we want to see that relationship continue in the way that it has. It would be good if the All Blacks didn't continue to win. That would be an ask that we would be making of the government. I suspect that's an ask that will be denied, but that aside, the relationship is going swimmingly. 

TAME: Finally, in your book ‘Tides that bind: Australia in the Pacific’, you talk about the importance of Australia's relationship with the US when it comes to the Pacific, and AUKUS is arguably a representation of that. Do you trust a President Donald Trump to maintain that relationship?

MARLES: Look, who is elected in the United States in a month's time is obviously a matter for the American people.

TAME: Would you trust him, though, as President?

MARLES: Well, we're confident that whoever is elected the President of the United States, that the alliance between Australia and America will remain strong. And it did so when President Trump was the president. We're also confident that the key equities in the relationship will also be maintained, AUKUS being front and centre amongst them. And that's not a guess. We have a concrete sense of that. Because when we look at those measures which have been enacted under AUKUS, literally enacted through the US Congress, through our own Parliament, through legislative regulatory changes in the United Kingdom, when we look at the American element of that, it's been supported by the entire spectrum of American politics – Democrats, Republicans, Trump Republicans. And so all the evidence is that right across the political spectrum in the United States, including those in the Republican Party and those who support President Trump, have also supported AUKUS.

ENDS  

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